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To guide risk assessment, expected numbers of cases
and generations were estimated, assuming a case
importation of Middle East respiratory syndrome
(MERS). Our analysis of 36 importation events yielded
the risk of observing secondary transmission events at
22.7% (95% confidence interval: 19.3–25.1). The risks
of observing generations 2, 3 and 4 were estimated at
10.5%, 6.1% and 3.9%, respectively. Countries at risk
should be ready for highly variable outcomes following an importation of MERS.
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) has continued to spread globally [1]. A large cluster of MERS
cases has been observed in the Republic of Korea since
May 2015 [2]. Until 1 July 2015, so-called quaternary
cases (i.e. generation 3 counting from the index case
as generation 0) have been reported in South Korea
[2]. Although the inter-human transmission potential of
MERS is considered to be too low to cause large-scale
epidemics [3-5], high variability and heterogeneity in
the transmission potential have been underscored [6].
As MERS continues to spread globally, it is vital that
risk assessment involves an evaluation of the potential outcomes following MERS importation events [7].
Among a total of 23 importation events in countries
outside the Middle East region, there have been four
MERS case importations that have given rise to at least
one secondary transmission event [2].
While the basic reproduction number R0, i.e. the average number of secondary cases produced by a primary
case in a fully susceptible population, is less than 1 for
MERS and a major epidemic may therefore not occur
immediately, it is critical to quantitatively assess several risks of MERS transmission following an importation event, e.g. the expected numbers of cases and
6

generations. The present study aims to analyse the
observed importation events of MERS and estimate the
expected size of MERS clusters and the number of generations using a stochastic epidemic model.

Importation data

Using secondary data sources [2,7-11], we extracted
the numbers of secondary cases and generations for
each reported importation event of MERS. We excluded
data from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates from the analysis because cases
in these endemic countries have frequently experienced exposures to a domestic animal reservoir (e.g.
dromedary camels). Moreover, it has not been possible to fully track the transmission trees (i.e. via contact
tracing data) in these countries. Including Middle East
countries other than those, a total of 36 importation
events were analysed. Of these, 13 events occurred
in the Middle East, reported from Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Turkey and Yemen. In the present study, statistical estimation of parameters was
done using two different sets of data, i.e. using all 36
importation events and restricting the analysis to the
23 importation events observed in areas outside of the
Middle East. The latter data were analysed separately
because the dynamics of case importation including
the frequency of exposures and local contact patterns
for those 23 events may not be fully comparable with
the remaining 13 events.

Mathematical model

The importation event data were analysed using a
branching process model which allowed us to jointly
estimate the transmissibility, R0, and the dispersion
parameter, k, by assuming that the distribution of
secondary cases per single primary case followed a
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negative binomial distribution. Using the branching
process model, the risk of observing at least one secondary transmission event, the risk of observing each
generation of cases and the total number of cases were
estimated. Hence, an important assumption to calculate these risks based on observed importation event
data is that each importation event was a random sample drawn from the assumed model. For the estimation
of the two model parameters, we used two different
pieces of likelihood. The first one analyses the distribution of the total number of cases as described by
Breban et al. for MERS [4], but the present study specifically focused on importation events [12]. Given the
total number of cases z for each importation event, the
likelihood to estimate R0 and k was calculated as
distribution and the risk of observing each generation
of cases, the covariance matrix was used to draw random samples of R0 and k from a bivariate normal distribution with the correlation parameter informed by the
matrix. The simulations were run 10,000 times, allowing us to take percentile points for the calculation of
uncertainty bounds.

Results

The number of observed importation events was limited to 36 and the sample size was small. To reduce
uncertainty, we analysed in addition the number of
generations per importation. Considering the concept
of generation to extinction, we derived the probability
distribution of the number of generations, i.e.

Figure 1 illustrates the original data employed to quantify our model.
The distribution of the total number of cases was right
skewed, including two outbreaks with a total of at
least eight cases. Excluding the Middle East countries,
only the ongoing South Korean outbreak was the one
that involved eight or more cases. With regard to the
number of generations, three quarters of the importations (27/36) did not result in any secondary transmission. Secondary transmissions were observed in
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, France, Republic of Korea, Oman
(twice), Tunisia and the United Kingdom. Excluding
Middle East countries, 19 of 23 importations did not
generate any secondary cases (Table 1). Among the
total of 36 importations, generation 3 (or the so-called
quaternary cases) was observed only for the ongoing
South Korean outbreak.
Table 2 shows the estimates of R0 and k. Based on
a total of 36 events, R0 and k were estimated at 0.75
(95% CI: 0.54–1.09) and 0.14 (95% CI: 0.06–0.32),
respectively.

from which we obtained the likelihood function L2 for
the observed number of generations, derived from
Pr(g ≤ h)-Pr(g ≤ h-1) for h > 1, i.e.
and so forth. The total likelihood was given by the
product of L1 and L2. The maximum likelihood method
was employed to statistically infer the parameters, and
the profile likelihood-based confidence intervals (CI)
were computed. To account for both stochasticity and
parameter uncertainty in calculating the outbreak size
www.eurosurveillance.org

The value of k was substantially smaller than 1, indicating that the distribution of secondary cases per single
primary case was highly over-dispersed. Analysing the
23 importation events out of the Middle East countries, the estimates of R0 and k were 0.81 (95% CI:
0.49–1.46) and 0.07 (95% CI: 0.02–0.21), respectively.
These estimates were not significantly different from
those obtained using the total set of 36 importation
events. For this reason, simulations were conducted
using estimates derived from the full set of 36 importation events.
7

Figure 1
Importation events of Middle East respiratory syndrome
(n = 36)
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(e.g. 0 indicates that the imported index case did not generate any
secondary cases), while the total number of cases represents the
cumulative number of confirmed cases including the index case
(e.g. 1 indicates that the imported index case did not generate any
secondary cases). For instance, in France, there was a secondary
transmission, causing generation 1, but there was only 1 secondary
case without tertiary case, and thus, the total number of cases was
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According to our classification, Turkey was included in the Middle
East.
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Table 1
Importation of Middle East respiratory syndrome to
the 23 countries outside the Middle East that have
experienced case until 1 July 2015 (n = 208 cases)
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A. The observed number of importation events as a function of the
total number of cases. An importation event frequently ends up
with only the imported (index) case, i.e. without generating any
secondary cases.
B. Observed number of importation events by total number
of generations observed for each importation. Generation 0
represents the imported (index) case, generation 1 represents
secondary cases produced by the imported case, and so forth.

Figure 2 shows the expected total number of cases and
the risk of observing each generation conditional on an
importation event.
The risk of observing at least one secondary transmission was 22.7% (95% CI: 19.3–25.1) (Figure 2A).
The risks of observing generations 2, 3 and 4 were,
respectively, 10.5%, 6.1% and 3.9% (Figure 2B). When
generation 2 (tertiary cases) was observed, the conditional risk of observing the next generation (quaternary cases) was as large as 63.6% (95% CI: 46.7–74.4)
(Figure 2C). The outbreak size distribution appeared to
be highly skewed (Figure 2D). Assuming an importation
occurred, the risk of observing eight or more cases in
total would be 10.9% (95% CI: 7.6–13.6).

Discussion

The present study analysed importation events of MERS
with a particular focus on the associated outbreak size
8
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Figure 2
Probabilities of observing multiple generations of Middle East respiratory syndrome cases given one case importation
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A. Frequency distribution of the probability of observing at least one secondary case caused by an imported (index) case, based on a total of
10,000 simulation runs.
B. Probability that the transmission survives to a specific generation given an imported (index) case.
C. Conditional probability that the transmission goes extinct at the particular generation given case(s) in the corresponding generation. Until
20 June 2015, cases of MERS up to generation 3 (i.e. or the so-called quaternary cases) have been diagnosed in South Korea.
D. Frequency distribution of the total number of cases given an imported case.
In panels B, C and D, filled circles represent the posterior median of simulations, while whiskers extend to upper and lower 95% credible
intervals, based on 10,000 posterior resampling simulation runs.

and number of disease generations arising from each
importation event. Our findings indicate that if a case
of MERS was imported, at least one secondary transmission event would be observed with a probability
of 22.7%. The risk of involving tertiary, quaternary
and quinary cases was also calculated (Figure 2B).
Although our study only relied upon importation events
consisting of a small number of clusters, the estimated
R0 was broadly consistent with published estimates
that analysed larger cluster datasets mainly observed
in Middle East countries [3-5] and was smaller than
www.eurosurveillance.org

estimates derived from the early phase of hospitalassociated outbreaks [13]. Considering that countries
at risk of importation (i.e. countries without infected
animal reservoirs) have had to confront the uncertainty
associated with the risk of experiencing a case importation [14,15,16], our modelling analyses could facilitate quantitative risk assessment.
An important outcome of the present study is that the
risk of observing multiple generations of MERS cases
was estimated at 22.7% and that of a tertiary case at
9

Table 2
Estimated transmission potential and dispersion parameter of Middle East respiratory syndrome based on imported case
data
Basic reproduction number
(95% CI)a

Dispersion parameter
(95% CI)

All importation events (n = 36)

0.75 (0.54–1.09)

0.14 (0.06–0.32)

Importation events in countries other than Middle East (n = 23)b

0.81 (0.49–1.46)

0.07 (0.02–0.21)

CI: confidence interval.
a
95% confidence intervals were derived from the profile likelihood.
b
Excluded Middle East countries are: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Turkey and Yemen.

10.5% in our model. Since the distribution of secondary
cases per single primary case is highly over-dispersed,
superspreading events can occur, and thus, the
expected total number of cases is highly variable. The
finding echoes a recent re-analysis of clusters of MERS
cases reported up to August 2013 [17]. Of course, we
can expect that secondary transmission events could
be prevented by a combination of contact tracing, monitoring suspected cases, early diagnosis and isolation
of infectious individuals. Besides, the present study
suggests that countries at risk of importation should
keep in mind that a large cluster of cases with multiple
generations may well occur, even though R0 is clearly
below the epidemic threshold at 1.0 [18].
In addition to the risk of observing a certain number of
generations following an imported case, we also calculated the conditional risk of observing the next generation of case(s). This is in line with a risk assessment
in real time: because the exact number of cases in a
single generation cannot be manually counted during
the course of an outbreak, it is reasonable to calculate
the conditional risk given a generation where the conditional probability of observing the next generation is
usually greater than 50%.
Two important limitations should be noted. Firstly, our
exercise regarded each observed importation event as
a random draw governed by the proposed probability
model. Indeed, this assumption is unavoidable for fitting a branching process model to the data [3,4]. While
the assumption may be common among modelling
studies, it did not allow us to account for the variable
type and effectiveness of interventions, especially at
later generations of cases in each cluster. Secondly,
MERS outbreaks have frequently been amplified in
healthcare settings [6,19,20], but we limited ourselves
to accounting for individual heterogeneity in a general
sense. An improvement on this point was difficult,
because MERS outbreaks have been seen mostly in
healthcare settings without large-scale community
transmission. The transmission dynamics in and out of
healthcare settings have not been consistently characterised across individual outbreaks of MERS.

Despite these limitations, the present study successfully characterised the risk of observing a certain number of cases and generations given a case importation
of MERS. The risk of at least one secondary case in
our model was 22.7%, and that of a tertiary case was
10.5%. Once an untraced case is imported, countries
at risk should assume that the secondary transmission
risk as well as the risk of observing multiple generations of cases exists and should be ready to respond
effectively by following their preparedness plans to
manage emerging infectious diseases.
Acknowledgements
HN received funding support from the Japan Society for
the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant Numbers
26670308 and 26700028, Japan Agency for Medical Research
and Development, the Japan Science and Technology Agency
(JST) CREST program and RISTEX program for Science of
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy. GC acknowledge financial support from the Division of International
Epidemiology and Population Studies, The Fogarty
International Center, United States National Institutes of
Health, funded in part by the Office of Pandemics and
Emerging Threats at the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, as well as support from grants NSF
grant 1414374 as part of the joint NSF-NIH-USDA Ecology
and Evolution of Infectious Diseases programme, United
Kingdom Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research
Council grant BB/M008894/1 and NSF-IIS Grant#1518939.
The funders had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.

Conflict of interest
None declared.

Authors’ contributions
HN conceived mathematical modelling method and
analysed the data. HN, YM, GC and MS drafted and
revised the manuscript.
References
1.

10

Zumla A, Hui DS, Perlman S. Middle East respiratory syndrome.
Lancet. 2015. Corrected proofs in press. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60454-8

www.eurosurveillance.org

2. World Health Organization (WHO). Global Alert and Response
(GAR). Coronavirus infections. Geneva: WHO. [Accessed: 22 Jun
2015]. Available from: http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/
disease/coronavirus_infections/en/
3. Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Van Kerkhove MD, Donnelly CA,
Riley S, Rambaut A, et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus: quantification of the extent of the epidemic,
surveillance biases, and transmissibility. Lancet Infect
Dis. 2014;14(1):50-6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S14733099(13)70304-9 PMID:24239323
4. Breban R, Riou J, Fontanet A. Interhuman transmissibility of
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: estimation of
pandemic risk. Lancet. 2013;382(9893):694-9. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61492-0 PMID:23831141
5. Chowell G, Blumberg S, Simonsen L, Miller MA, Viboud C.
Synthesizing data and models for the spread of MERS-CoV,
2013: key role of index cases and hospital transmission.
Epidemics. 2014;9:40-51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
epidem.2014.09.011 PMID:25480133
6. Fisman DN, Leung GM, Lipsitch M. Nuanced risk assessment
for emerging infectious diseases. Lancet. 2014;383(9913):18990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62123-6
PMID:24439726
7. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).
Severe respiratory diseases associated with Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). Fifteenth
update – 8 March 2015. Stockholm: ECDC, 2015. Available
from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/
MERS_update_08-Mar2014.pdf
8. Thomas HL, Zhao H, Green HK, Boddington NL, Carvalho CF,
Osman HK, et al. Enhanced MERS coronavirus surveillance of
travelers from the Middle East to England. Emerg Infect Dis.
2014;20(9):1562-4. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2009.140817
PMID:25148267
9. Yavarian J, Rezaei F, Shadab A, Soroush M, Gooya MM, Azad
TM. Cluster of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
infections in Iran, 2014. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015;21(2):362-4.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2102.141405 PMID:25626079
10. Al-Abaidani IS, Al-Maani AS, Al-Kindi HS, Al-Jardani AK, AbdelHady DM, Zayed BE, et al. Overview of preparedness and
response for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV) in Oman. Int J Infect Dis. 2014;29:309-10. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2014.10.003 PMID:25447719
11. Hijawi B, Abdallat M, Sayaydeh A, Alqasrawi S, Haddadin
A, Jaarour N, et al. Novel coronavirus infections in Jordan,
April 2012: epidemiological findings from a retrospective
investigation. East Mediterr Health J. 2013;19(Suppl 1):S12-8.
PMID:23888790
12. 12. Nishiura H, Yan P, Sleeman CK, Mode CJ. Estimating the
transmission potential of supercritical processes based on
the final size distribution of minor outbreaks. J Theor Biol.
2012;294:48-55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.10.039
PMID:22079419
13. Majumder MS, Rivers C, Lofgren E, Fisman D. Estimation of
MERS-Coronavirus Reproductive Number and Case Fatality
Rate for the Spring 2014 Saudi Arabia Outbreak: Insights from
Publicly Available Data. PLoS Curr. 2014;6: pii:ecurrents.out
breaks.98d2f8f3382d84f390736cd5f5fe133c. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1371/currents.outbreaks.98d2f8f3382d84f390736cd5f5
fe133c PMID: 25685622
14. Poletto C, Gomes MF, Pastore y Piontti A, Rossi L, Bioglio L,
Chao DL, et al. Assessing the impact of travel restrictions
on international spread of the 2014 West African Ebola
epidemic. Euro Surveill. 2014;19(42):20936. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES2014.19.42.20936 PMID:25358040</
15. Nishiura H, Mizumoto K, Ejima K, Zhong Y, Cowling B, Omori
R. Incubation period as part of the case definition of severe
respiratory illness caused by a novel coronavirus. Euro
Surveill. 2012;17(42):20296. PMID:23098822
16. Ejima K, Aihara K, Nishiura H. Probabilistic differential
diagnosis of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)
using the time from immigration to illness onset among
imported cases. J Theor Biol. 2014;346:47-53. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.024 PMID:24406808
17. Kucharski AJ, Althaus CL. The role of superspreading in
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
transmission. Euro Surveill. 2015;20(25):21167. Available
from: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.
aspx?ArticleId=21167 PMID:26132768</jrn>
18. <jrn>18. Bauch CT, Oraby T. Assessing the pandemic potential
of MERS-CoV. Lancet. 2013;382(9893):662-4. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)61504-4 PMID:23831143
19. Cowling BJ, Park M, Fang VJ, Wu P, Leung GM, Wu JT.
Preliminary epidemiological assessment of MERSCoV outbreak in South Korea, May to June 2015. Euro
Surveill. 2015;20(25):21163. Available from: http://www.

www.eurosurveillance.org

eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=21163
PMID:26132767
20. Park HY, Lee EJ, Ryu YW, Kim Y, Kim H, Lee H, et al.
Epidemiological investigation of MERS-CoV spread in a
single hospital in South Korea, May to June 2015. Euro
Surveill. 2015;20(25):21169. Available from: http://www.
eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=21169
PMID:26132766

11

